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Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.:
Federal Regulatory Scheme in Nuclear
Energy Industry Does Not Preclude
Application of State Tort Law
I.

Introduction

The ability to impose punitive damages in a tort claim has
traditionally been within the jurisdiction of a state court.'
In Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp.,2 the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed this authority in the face of
strong opposition. 3 This opposition, voiced largely by
representatives of the nuclear energy industry and the
federal agencies 4 charged with its regulation, was overcome
by a slim margin in the Court. 5 This controversy was based
on an action for personal injuries brought under Oklahoma
common law tort principles.6 Damages were sought for
injuries suffered by decedent, Karen Silkwood, during a
7
nine day period as a result of plutonium contamination.
The issue presented to the Court was whether the federal
scheme of nuclear regulation" preempts an award of
punitive damages under state common law.
This note will focus on the applicability of state tort law to
a radiation injury that does not reach the level of an

1. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 625 (1984).
2. Id.
3. Of the seventeen briefs filed with the Court, four were in opposition: Brief for
Appellees, June 29, 1983; Brief of the Atomic Industry Forum as amicus curiae of
Appellees, June 27, 1983; Brief for United States as amicus curiae in support of
Appellees, June 25, 1983; Brief for United States as amicus curiae, November 30,
1982.
4. See supra note 3.
5. The decision was a 5-4 plurality. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
6. Id. at 618.
7. Id.
8. Atomic Energy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981); see infra
note 75.
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"extraordinary nuclear occurrence" 9 (ENO) as defined by

the Price-Anderson Act. 10 Attention will be given to the
question of the extent of federal preemption in the nuclear
energy industry. A review of the factual and legal
background of the case, an examination of the reasoning of
the Supreme Court and a discussion of the legal and social
implications of the decision will follow.
II.

Background

Karen Silkwood was employed as a laboratory analyst in
a nuclear fuel processing plant operated by defendants,
Kerr-McGee Corporation," from August, 1972 to November,
1974.12 The facility was located in Cimarron, Oklahoma' 3
14
and was licensed by the Atomic Energy Commission
(AEC). Observance of AEC regulations was a condition of

the license. 15 As interpreted by the AEC1 6 and the nuclear
9. "Extraordinary nuclear occurrence" is defined as:
Any event causing a discharge or dispersal of source, special
nuclear, or by-product material from its intended place of confinement in
amounts offsite, or causing radiation levels offsite, which the Commission
determines to be substantial, and which the Commission determines has
resulted or will probably result in substantial damages to persons offsite or
property offsite.
42 U.S.C. § 2014(j) (1976).
10. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957); see infra note 75.
11. Silkwood was employed by Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corp., a subsidiary of
Kerr-McGee Corp. The jury found the subsidiary was the "mere
instrumentality" of the parent. As a result, the parent was held liable for the
activities of its subsidiary. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 617
n.1 (1984). (Both entities are hereinafter jointly referred to as Kerr-McGee).
12. Brief for Appellants, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984)
(available on Lexis, Genfed library, Briefs file).
13. The Cimarron plant was permanently closed in 1975. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct.
at 618 n.2.
14. 42 U.S.C. § 2073 (1976) authorizes the Commission to license facilities
such as Kerr-McGee who handle nuclear materials such as plutonium.
15. 42 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1976) empowers the Commission to set standards
governing the possession and use of nuclear materials; 42 U.S.C. § 2073(e)
(1976) makes compliance with the Commission's regulations a condition to
licensing.
16. The AEC is now the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). 42 U.S.C. §
5814 (1976); 42 U.S.C. § 5841 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
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energy industry, the AEC regulations were only a reflection
of minimum safety standards. Compliance with them did
not guarantee safety. 17 The licensees were expected to do
more than the minimal requirements if necessitated by
reasonable prudence.' 8
Fuel pins containing plutonium 19 were fabricated at the
Cimarron plant. Plutonium, one of the most carcinogenic
and dangerous substances known, 20 is classified in the
22
Price-Anderson Act 2 ' as a "special nuclear material."
Silkwood's job required her to handle plutonium, through a
glove box,2 3 on a daily basis. All employees who handled
plutonium made routine checks for radiation
24
contamination.
On three occasions, November 5,6, and 7, 1974, Silkwood
was found to be contaminated with plutonium. 25 There is
little evidence to establish exactly how the contamination
incidents occurred. 26 The first incident apparently occurred
at the plant. It was discovered by Silkwood during a work

break, when she monitored herself with the plutonium
detecting device supplied by Kerr-McGee in accordance
with AEC regulations. 2 7 She was immediately
17. Brief for Appellants, supra note 12.

18. Id.
19. Plutonium is an artificially produced radioactive chemical element which

has been instrumental in the development of nuclear weapons and nuclear
power. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee, 667 F.2d 908, 913 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 615 (1984).
20. Id.
21. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), see infra note 75.
22. The term "special nuclear material" includes plutonium or any material
that the NRC finds capable of releasing substantial amounts of atomic energy.
42 U.S.C. §§ 2014 (aa), 2071 (1976). The classification makes plutonium subject to
regulation and licensing by the NRC. Id. at § 2073. See supra note 15.
23. A glove box is a supposedly impervious box surrounding the plutonium and
the plutonium processing equipment which has glove-like holes permitting the
operator to manipulate the material from outside the box. Silkwood, 104 S.Ct.
at 618 n.3.
24. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 915 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
104 S.Ct. 615 (1984).
25. Id. at 913.
26. Id.
27. Id.
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decontaminated at the plant and supplied with a voiding
collection kit to monitor the contamination. 28 The next day
she engaged in clerical work and did not work with
plutonium at all. 29 Nevertheless, she tested herself and was
again found to be contaminated. 3 0 The source of this
contamination is unknown. 31 The third incident occurred
away from the plant, presumably at home, since she was
found to be contaminated upon her arrival at the plant. 32
Upon inspection by a Kerr-McGee decontamination
squad, 3 3 her apartment was found to be contaminated as
well. 34 Contaminated items from her apartment were
confiscated and destroyed. 35 In addition, her urine and fecal
samples were tested and it was determined that they were
36
spiked with plutonium.
Karen Silkwood was sent to the Los Alamos Scientific
Laboratory in New Mexico to undergo further
contamination testing. 3 7 She returned to work on November
13, 1974. On that day, Silkwood was killed in an automobile
accident.38 Thus, her radiation induced injuries, which form
the basis for this tort action, covered a nine day period
ending with her death.
This action was initiated in the United States District
Court for the Western District of Oklahoma by Silkwood's
father, as administrator of her estate. Her three children
were named as beneficiaries. Defendants were Silkwood's
employer, Kerr-McGee Nuclear Corporation, and its parent

28. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 618.
29. Id.
30. Id.
31. Silkwood v Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908,913 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S.
Ct. 615 (1984).
32. Id. at 914.
33. Briefs for Appellants, see supra note 12.
34. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 618.
35. Id.
36. The samples contained insoluble, rather than naturally secreted,
plutonium. Id. at n.4.
37. Id.
38. Id.
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corporation, Kerr-McGee Corporation. 39 Plaintiff sought
both actual and punitive damages. 40 The jury found the
defendants liable on both strict liability and negligence
principles, 4 1 and awarded actual damages of $505,00042 and
punitive damages of $10,000,000. 43 The verdict was
accepted by the court and judgment was entered against the
defendants. 4 4 The district court based its decision on a
finding that the injury involved was not covered by the
Price-Anderson Act. 45 The court reasoned that the PriceAnderson Act 46 was not intended to preempt state tort
48
7
principles in a sub-threshold 4 nuclear incident.
Defendants then entered alternative motions for judgment
notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial. 49 The district
50
court denied both motions.
On review the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 5 ' found that
the lower court erred in not granting a judgment
notwithstanding the verdict. Both the personal injury and

39. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 618 n.1; see supra note 11.
40. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 571 (W.D. Okla. 1979),
rev'd, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
41. Id. at 570.
42. $5,000 for property damage and $500,000 for special personal injury.
Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 619.
43. Id.
44. 485 F. Supp. at 570.
45. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), see infra note 75.
46. Id.
47. A sub-threshold nuclear incident does not meet the requirements to be
classified as an extraordinary nuclear occurrence (ENO). See supra note 9 for
definition of ENO.
48. A "nuclear incident" is defined as:
Any occurrence, including an extraordinary nuclear occurrence,
within the United States causing ... bodily injury, sickness, disease or death, or
loss of or damage to property, or loss of use of property, arising out of or
resulting from the radioactive, toxic, explosive, or other hazardous properties
of source, special nuclear, or by-product material.
42 U.S.C. § 2014(q) (1976).
49. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 570 (W.D. Okla. 1979),
rev'd, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
50. Id.
51. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104
S. Ct. 615 (1984).
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punitive damage awards were reversed. 52 Adopting the
defendants' contention that the personal injury award was
precluded by the Oklahoma Worker's Compensation
statute, 53 the court found that it could not be established
that the contamination in question occurred away from the
workplace. Therefore, it was determined that worker's
compensation was the exclusive remedy. The punitive
damages award of $10,000,000 was set aside on the ground
that the Atomic Energy Act54 preempts all state law in the
nuclear energy area. 5 5 Thus, a broad preemption policy was
established by the Tenth Circuit. The court concluded that a
judicial award of punitive damages designed to punish past
acts or deter future acts was equivalent to state regulation. 56
Silkwood appealed seeking review of the appellate court's
ruling in regard to punitive damages. 57 Contrary to
appellee's assertion, 58 the United States Supreme Court
found that the decision below was reviewable by writ of
certiorari. 59 The Court then addressed the central issue:
whether the federal scheme of nuclear regulation preempts
an award of punitive damages under state common law.
The Court held, in a 5 to 4 decision, 60 that it did not.
III.

Discussion

The doctrine of federal preemption, which emanates from
61
the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution,

52. Id.
53. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 85 §§ 1-180 (West 1970 & Supp. 1983-84).
54. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
55. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 667 F.2d 908, 923 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd,
104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
56. Id.
57. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 620.
58. Brief for Appellees, Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984)
(available on Lexis, Genfed library, Briefs file).
59. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 621.
60. Justices White, Brennan, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor concurred in
the majority opinion. Justices Marshall, Blackmun, Powell and Chief Justice
Burger joined in the dissent. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
61. The Supremacy Clause states:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be
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elevates federal law above state law. Once it is determined
that the federal government has the power to regulate in a
given area, the question is whether the federal regulation
completely excludes state action over the same subject
matter.6 2 The federal regulatory authorities in the nuclear
energy area are the Atomic Energy Act 6 3 and the PriceAnderson Act.6 4 Preemption may be either express or,
absent express preemptive65language, Congress' intention to
preempt may be implied.
When compliance with both federal and state law is an
impossibility, federal preemption is inescapable. 6 6 When
there is no physical impossibility, the Court must premise
its review on the assumption that the traditional powers of
the state are not to be superseded unless clear congressional
intent to the contrary is noted. 6 7 Where congressional intent
is clearly in support of total preemption, the states may not
enter the area.6 8 Congress, however, does not typically act
on a wholesale basis with regard to preemption.6 9 Entrance
into one area does not necessarily lead to preemption of a
related area. Only when it is impossible to comply with both
state and federal law does a conflict arise. This conflict is
then resolved in favor of federal preemption.70 In Silkwood
there is no inevitable collision between federal and state

made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made,
under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law ofthe Land;
and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the contrary notwithstanding.

U.S. Constitution art. VI, cl. 2.
62. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director of the Dep't. of
Agric. of Cal., 373 U.S. 132 (1963).
63, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976 & Supp. V 1981).
64. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), see infra note 75.
65. Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
66. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director of the Dep't of
Agric. of Cal., 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
67. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
68. Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141, 15253 (1982).
69. Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, Director of the Dep't of Agric.
of Cal., 373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963).
70. Id.
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law. On the contrary, the extent of the tort remedies in
personal injury cases is an area which the Court has
traditionally71regarded as properly within the scope of state
supervision.
An examination of congressional intent should precede
any suggestion of preemption. In PacificGas & ElectricCo.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development
Commission72 the Court concluded that federal law has
occupied the entire field of nuclear safety except the limited
powers expressly left to the states. 73 Kerr-McGee suggests
74
that this holding is dispositive of the present controversy.
The Court disagrees basing its analysis on an examination
of the legislative history of the Atomic Energy Act and its
subsequent

amendment,

the Price-Anderson

Act. 75

the record in Silkwood is void of
According to the Court,
76
preemptive intent.

A.

FederalRegulatory Scheme

Following World War II the federal government alone
controlled the field of nuclear energy. 77 It soon became
apparent that private involvement in the area was needed
in order to hasten its development. 78 In 1954 Congress
passed a revised Atomic Energy Act 79 which established the

AEC.

0

The AEC was given jurisdiction over the atomic

71. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 104 S. Ct. 615, 621 (1984).
72. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
73. Id. at 1726, quoted in Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 622.
74. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 622.
75. The Price-Anderson Act was added as § 170 to the Atomic Energy Act of
1954. See also text accompanying notes 85-90. Price-Anderson Act, Pub. L.
No. 85-256, § 4, 71 Stat. 576 (1957) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 2210
(1976)).
76. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 623.
77. Atomic Energy Act of 1946, ch. 724, 35, 60 Stat. 755 (1946).
78. Maleson, The HistoricalRoots of the Legal System's Response to Nuclear
Power, 55 S. Calif. L. Rev. 597, 601 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Maleson].
79. Ch. 1073, 68 Stat. 919 (1954)(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-2296 (1976
& Supp. V 1981)).
80. See supra note 16.
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energy industry. 8 1 Private industry had to conform to
federal regulations and be licensed in order to be permitted
to enter this potentially lucrative field. 8 2 However, private
industry was still wary based on the potential of unlimited
liability in the event of a major accident. 83 In response to
this concern, Congress passed the Price-Anderson Act in
1957.84

Prior to the enactment of Price-Anderson Act, 85 Congress
intended that all questions of liability for radiation injuries
be submitted for determination under state tort law. 86 The
Price-Anderson Act placed a ceiling of $560 million on
aggregate liability for a single accident. 87 In 1966 Congress
amended the Price-Anderson Act and called for a waiver of
certain key defenses8 8 in order to assure the plaintiff the
advantage of strict liability. 89 The waiver of defenses is not
triggered unless the nuclear incident is classified as an
EN0 90 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The
Price-Anderson Act is not directly applicable to this case
because Silkwood's injury did not rise to the level of an
"extraordinary nuclear occurrence '91 Nevertheless, the
Court reasoned that Congress assumed the applicability of
state tort law remedies to nuclear accidents.92 The
relationship between the Price-Anderson Act and existing
state tort law was described as viable unless the accident
reached the proportions referred to in the Act.9 3 Thus, the

81. Note, Implied Pre-Emption of Punitive Damages for Nuclear Accidents,
29 Am. U.L. Rev. 741, 745 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Implied Pre-Emption].
82. Maleson, supra note 78, at 611.
83. Implied Pre-Emption,supra note 81, at 742.
84. See supra note 75.
85. Id.
86. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566,573 (W.D. Okla. 1979), rev'd,
667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).
87. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(e) (1976).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(1) (1976).
89. Implied Pre-Emption,supra note 81, at 747.
90. See supra note 9.
91. See supra note 47.
92. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 623.
93. Id.
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Court concluded that Congress' clear intention was to
support the application of state tort law even though the
NRC was the exclusive regulatory authority in the area of
nuclear safety matters.
Consequently, the decision in Pacific Gas & Electric94
was not determined to preclude a damage award under state
tort law. Particular reference was made to the effect of the
1966 amendment to the Price-Anderson Act. 95 A direct effect
of imposing strict liability on defendants in a nuclear
accident is the resulting enlargement of the plaintiffs
rights. The rights of both plaintiffs and defendants in such
a situation are established by state law. 96 "The entire
[congressional] discussion surrounding the 1966
amendment was premised on the assumption that state
remedies were available notwithstanding the NRC's
exclusive regulatory authority," 97 according to the Court.
The AEC concurred in this determination. 98 Hosts of
commentators have also supported this view. 99 Under the
circumstances, the overwhelming weight of opinion
suggests that the Price-Anderson Act sought to deal only
with certain problems existing in state law that impair the
ability of radiation-injured employees to recover under state
law. 100 Therefore, the Price-Anderson Act may be viewed as
an extension or expansion of state law in this area, not as a
limiting factor. There is no preemption problem when, as
here, Congress manifests its intention that state law play a
specific role in the liability scheme. 10
B. FederalPreemption
Finally, even where dual regulation is not expressly
94. 103 S. Ct. 1713 (1983).
95. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 623.
96. Id. at 624.
97. Id. at 625.
98. Silkwood v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 485 F. Supp. 566, 573 (W.D. Okla. 1979),
rev'd, 667 F.2d 908 (10th Cir. 1981), rev'd, 104 S. Ct. 615 (1984).

99. Id.
100. Id. at 574.
101. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 624-25.
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prohibited by Congress such a prohibition may be
implied. 102 Key factors to determine whether Congress has,
by implication, preempted an area may include a look at the
statutory language itself, the legislative history, the
pervasiveness of the federal scheme, the nature of the
subject matter regulated, the requirement of uniformity and
ultimately, whether state law would obstruct congressional
objectives. 103 Here, there is no suggestion of either express
or implied preemption. A tort action is a far cry from a
regulatory system.
At this point some consideration must be given to
appellee's argument that punitive damages are a form of
regulation and, therefore, pose a threat to federal
supremacy in the nuclear energy area. 10 4 The award of
exemplary damages cannot hamper federal government
regulation. This view is illustrated by the Court's decision in
FloridaLime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,Directorof
the Department of Agriculture of California10 5 which held
that a state regulation promulgating standards for
avocados may stand alongside a federal regulation in the
same area because no conflict existed and no evidence 10of6
congressional intent to preempt the field was apparent.
In FloridaLime both the federal and state statutes involved
regulation schemes. 10 7 In Silkwood the state tort law
remedy is an issue collateral to the one covered by the
federal regulations. There is no direct overlap. Since conflict
was not found in FloridaLime, none should be found here.
The Court has evinced a reluctance to declare implied
preemption in the absence of substantial evidence.' 0 8 Here
we are involved not with the possibility of direct

102.
103.
(1982);
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.

Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977).
Fidelity Federal Savings & Loan Assoc. v. de la Cuesta, 458 U.S. 141,153
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Brief for Appellees, supra note 58.
373 U.S. 132 (1963).
Id. at 141.
Id. at 143.
Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 626.
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interference as in FloridaLime, but with a tort action which
cannot impede federal government regulation in the same
way. As the Court states, tort law has always been deemed
to be a matter of peculiar local concern. 10 9
A contrary view may be seen in Northern States Power
Co. v. Minnesota.110 There the Court held that Minnesota
could not impose state licensing and regulation on state
power plants in the face of a similar federal regulatory
scheme."1 The clear intent of Congress was found to be
preemption." 2 The Court in Train v. Colorado Public
Interest Research Group" 3 reinforced the view of Northern
States when it held that the AEC had exclusive control over
the discharge of nuclear materials. 1 4 Taken together, the
cases support the view that any state action that competes
with AEC regulation of radiation hazards associated with
plants handling nuclear material should be held invalid.
Nevertheless, the pervasiveness of the federal scheme
must be considered before preemption is found." 5 The
application of state tort law is a matter collateral to the
federal regulatory scheme. The two areas are not
inextricably intertwined. Application of state tort law to
isolated instances of radiation exposure would do nothing
to obstruct the objectives of Congress.
C.

Punitive Damages

Although the Price-Anderson Act does not address the
issue of punitive damages, this need not be read 1as6
precluding them in states that permit such damages.
Punitive damages are damages, other than compensatory
damages, awarded for the purpose of punishment or

109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Id. at 625.
447 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd mem., 405 U.S. 1035 (1972).
Id. at 1154.
Id. at 1152.
426 U.S. 1 (1976).
Id. at 24.
Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947).
Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 624-25.
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deterrence, and are based on the defendant's outrageous or
reckless conduct. 117 The culpable mental state necessary for
an award of punitive damages is a question for the jury."18 A
knowing and intentional disregard of the duties above and
beyond those imposed by the federal regulations may
constitute the gross recklessness and indifference to the
safety of others that render punitive damages
appropriate. 119
Defendants argued that since they complied with federal
standards they could not be found liable under state
common law. 120 To do so, they insisted, would be to impose
state standards where the federal government does not
impose liability.121 The dissent suggests that a judicial award
of punitive damages is no less intrusive to the federal scheme
than direct legislative acts of the state. 122 The Court
recognized the tension between the determination that
safety concerns are the exclusive province of the federal law
and the determination that a state may award damages
based on state tort law. 123 However, the potential overlap is
one that Congress was willing to tolerate. 24 As the Court
suggests, they "can do no less." 125 It is not inconsistent with
congressional design to award punitive damages for the
escape of plutonium caused by grossly negligent, reckless
and willful conduct. 126 Indeed, the Court insists that the
127
health and safety of the public must not be sacrificed.
"The promotion of nuclear power is not to be accomplished
at all costs ',128 Adequate remedies must be available to
117. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 908 (1979).
118. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts, § 2, (4th ed. 1971).
119. Id.
120. Brief for Appellees, supra note 58.
121. Id.
122. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 635 (Powell, J. dissenting).
123. Id. at 625.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conserv. Dev.
Comm'n, 103 S. Ct. 1713, 1731 (1983), quoted in Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 626.
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those injured by exposure to hazardous nuclear
12 9
materials.
The Court's decision appears to reflect the heightened
public concern for safety in the nuclear energy industry.
Technology is no longer to be encouraged to the complete
exclusion of the public interest. In the final analysis a stand
by the judiciary that emphasizes public safety may lead to
greater accomplishments in the nuclear energy industry
based on increased public confidence.
IV.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court's decision that the award of punitive
damages is not preempted by federal law 130 preserves the
viability of state common law remedies in the nuclear
energy field. Careful consideration was given to the PriceAnderson Act' 3' by the Court. This scrutiny revealed
Congress' intention that state law be applied in the area of
tort remedies. 3 2 Preemption cannot be implied without a
clear indication of congressional design. Until Congress
acts to address the issue of punitive damages, the courts
should uphold the state's interest in protecting its citizens in
isolated cases of personal injury related to radiation.These
interests must be adequately served and protected from
those who would elevate technological advances above
human dignity.
Marcia H. Rimland

129. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 626.

130. Id.
131. Pub. L. No. 85-256, 71 Stat. 576 (1957), see supra note 75.
132. Silkwood, 104 S. Ct. at 626.
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